FOOTBALL — perhaps more than any other industry — loves its heroes. It loves creating them, it loves rewarding them, it loves showing them off and, ultimately, it loves to destroy them.
Fuelled by a combination of supporter adulation, media hype and — in most cases — a fiercely prodigious talent, the hero often transcends his individual situation and attains the weighty status of ‘public property.’ Inevitably, this brings with it higher levels of expectation. If these raised standards are not met, be they performance or behaviour related, then the fall from grace can be a swift one. Ask Fernando Torres.
There was a time when Graeme Souness was a true Liverpool hero. The ultimate skipper, he led the team through arguably the most dominant spell in its history. With unmatched commitment and will-to-win, the vision and artistry of a pre-Raphaelite painter and the kind of inspirational leadership more suited to Hollywood war movies, Souness drove us on to three consecutive league titles, a plethora of League Cups and, most impressive of all, the club’s fourth European Cup, secured deep in the belly of the beast.
If anything, his standing was enhanced when he turned his back on the prospect of continued success in Scotland, after five pioneering and controversial years in charge of Rangers, to answer Liverpool’s call in the wake of Kenny Dalglish’s unexpected resignation in 1991. But at that precise point, things finally started to go wrong for Graeme Souness. The dominant force of nature patrolling the Anfield turf was gone, replaced by a man seemingly oblivious to all notions of tact, sensitivity and, in the end, moral decency. He became, to all intents and purposes, an outcast, shunned and derided by the bulk of the Liverpool support.
That’s the thing about heroes; the higher we raise them, the further they have to fall.
Make no mistake, Souness was a dream of a player. There’s little point trying to define his role in relation to the nuances of contemporary tactical thinking, with such restrictive labels as ‘holding midfielder’ or ‘deep-lying playmaker’ failing to do justice to the range of his qualities. His game was an irresistible blend of subtlety and aggression, mixing the passing range of an Alonso with the tenacity of a Mascherano, the awareness of a Hamann with the sheer force of will of a Gerrard. Despite this he still amounted to considerably more than the sum of his parts.
Memorably depicted as ‘a bear of a man with the touch of a violinist’ Souness was at his best dictating the tempo of play. An ability to exert absolute control is a feature common to the game’s true midfield greats — the likes of Zidane, Platini, Zico and Xavi. It is a testament to his influence that Souness sits comfortably amid such exalted company.
If one performance could be seen to encapsulate everything that Souness the player represented, it was surely his final appearance in a red shirt. His last stand and his finest hour. In Rome in 1984, he absorbed the hostility of the home crowd, almost single-handedly faced down a Roma side packed with Italian World Cup winners and Brazilian superstars, and gave a display of dominance, composure and controlled aggression to rank with the finest individual displays in the club’s history. To put it simply, Souness prevailed.
Ironically, some of the characteristics that made Souness such a formidable leader on the pitch undermined his effectiveness as Liverpool manager. Arrogance, inflexibility, impatience, confrontation — these traits were the antithesis of ‘the Liverpool Way.’ According to the blueprint laid down by his predecessors, the manager’s job was part-psychologist, part-motivator, part-figurehead, part-dictator. It’s fair to say that Souness never fully got to grips with either the demands of the post or the expectations of the club’s supporters.
It’s worth remembering that the appointment of Graeme Souness as Liverpool manager was a decision that was welcomed almost unanimously. Despite growing evidence that an overhaul of the playing staff would be required sooner rather than later, most felt confident that the former skipper was the right man to take on the challenge. After all, he was one of us, wasn’t he?
The extent of the rebuild needed to keep Liverpool competitive would be a surprise to Souness. An ageing first-team, with obvious defensive weaknesses and an over-reliance on John Barnes to provide the magic, was crying out for an injection of high-quality new blood. What was even more shocking to him was that certain squad members seemed not to share the commitment that typified his own playing days and were instead more concerned with securing lucrative contracts or making time until their testimonial windfalls arrived.
Against such a backdrop, it is perhaps understandable that Souness approached the task in hand with obdurate ferocity and uncompromising haste. In retrospect, it is clear that he lacked both the judgement and long-term vision to pull it off.
One of the major criticisms levelled at Souness is that he cleared out too many players too quickly, replacing them with performers of markedly inferior quality. While it is hard to dispute the second part of that argument, the reality is that only seven players left the club in the first 12 months of his reign. Of these, four were already the wrong side of 30, while Speedie, Carter and a perma-crocked Gillespie were never likely to figure in a Liverpool building for the future.
The most contentious decisions saw Peter Beardsley and the promising Steve Staunton ushered out of Anfield. Again, hindsight is an unforgiving judge but there was a degree of logic to both deals that tempered some of the inevitable criticism. Beardsley’s form had tailed off after an impressive start to the 1990-91 season and, too often a peripheral presence, he was no longer a regular starter under Dalglish. With Ian Rush also approaching the veteran stage the need to revitalise the attack was a priority, and it therefore made some sense to cash in on the 30-year-old Beardsley. That he continued to perform to a high standard for a further six years, and was replaced by the undeniably limited Dean Saunders, only served to make the decision to sell appear glaringly misjudged.
Staunton was a victim of UEFA’s intermittent attempts to restrict the number of foreign nationals eligible for selection in European competition. Unpalatable though it seemed to some for Liverpool to discard a player of such potential, the reality was that the club had ample cover in Staunton’s favoured position, with both Burrows and Ablett having performed there effectively. However, the disquiet caused by these departures in particular was not easily quelled, and some of the goodwill that accompanied the arrival of Souness quickly began to be strained.
A more telling cause of unrest, and one which is harder to rationalise, was the quality of the signings Souness chose to make as he set about the task of restoring Liverpool’s fortunes. Quite simply, too many of the players brought in were below the required standard. Just as Saunders was no adequate replacement for Beardsley, so the likes of Walters, Kozma, Stewart and Piechnik bore little comparison to their illustrious forerunners. Towards the end of his time in charge, it seemed that Souness was attempting to mould a Liverpool in his own image, but by appearing to value steely abrasiveness above technical accomplishment, as personified by the signings of Ruddock and Dicks, the club’s traditional qualities were in danger of being submerged.
Allied to this, it soon became apparent that some of the central facets of a successful manager, things like effective man-management skills and tactical expertise, were missing from the Souness armoury. Key players became disaffected, injuries mounted (due, some said, to the introduction of an untypically strenuous training regime) and results inevitably suffered. By March 1993, almost two years after taking charge of the team, Souness’s Liverpool occupied fifteenth place in the embryonic Premier League, just three points above the relegation zone.
Clearly, all was not well.
Virtually the only positive to come out of the Souness tenure was his willingness to give young players a chance to prove their worth. Partly out of his disenchantment at the attitudes of some senior professionals, partly out of injury-induced necessity, his readiness to place his trust in emerging talent was refreshing. The likes of Fowler, McManaman, Redknapp, Jones, Marsh, Matteo, Hutchison and Harkness were given extended first-team opportunities and, with varying degrees of success, proved that youthfulness was no barrier to progress.
In spite of his managerial failings, failings which prompted his resignation after a humiliating FA Cup exit at home to Bristol City in January 1994, Souness’s place in Anfield’s glittering Hall of Fame would have remained largely untouched had it not been for an off-the-field misjudgment that was as hurtful as it was implausible.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLZ-izJAzAU
By selling the exclusive story of his heart-bypass operation to The Sun, the tawdry peddler of the most sickening anti-Liverpool lies in the wake of the Hillsborough disaster and the subject of a strictly-enforced boycott on Merseyside, Souness committed an offence that went far beyond the confines of the Anfield dressing room. That the paper chose to splash the piece across its front page on the third anniversary of the tragedy was typical of the callous insensitivity Kelvin MacKenzie, its morally bankrupt editor, revelled in. But it was also seen as a further kick in the teeth from the man whose job it was to represent the supporters, not collude in intensifying their pain.
To this day, resentment runs deep. Despite repeated apologies and an admission that he should have resigned immediately, Souness remains a divisive figure, with many understandably reluctant to accept that such actions were anything other than an insensitive, greed-fuelled insult. The defence that he was unaware of the strength of feeling towards The Sun, given he was in post at Rangers at the time of the disaster, was far from convincing from the outset.
Though the scars left by his actions may never heal for some, it is possible to accept that his regret is sincere. He has repeatedly claimed the incident to be the biggest mistake of his life and is clearly pained by the realisation that his time at Anfield has come to be defined by the hurt he caused rather than the enjoyment he provided. He still refers to Liverpool as ‘my club’ and would surely love to be accepted once more by the supporters he led to unforgettable and unprecedented triumphs. There can be no doubting the gravity of his offence, but it should not be forgotten that Graeme Souness is not the enemy and to regard him as such is to shift the blame and divert our anger from where it should rightly lie.
Perhaps there’s still time for this fallen hero to be brought back into the fold.
– Neil is a guest on this week’s edition of ‘And Could He Play’ – a new show about legends, unsung players and cult heroes
[rpfc_recent_posts_from_category meta=”true”]
Pics: PA Images.
He says on that clip “We had not won anything in 2 years when i arrived”. We were champions! And won FA Cup the year before,and had not finished outside the top 2 in 10 years.
Great player,but he demolished a great club within 12 months as manager.
He was appointed for last five games of the 90-91 season when we finished second.
He was also stabbed in the back by the senior players refusing to use the double training approach he had learned while in Italy, which has since been adopted by all clubs in Europe.
Despite having most of the players out injured, he still won something.
Today’s fans need to watch some of his goals (and tackles) on youtube, he was a beast. And while you’re at it, watch whatever late 70s and early 80s highlights you can find. Despite playing on a Sunday league pitch, the football was incredible at times.
Great player. Shit manager. Why can’t people get that?
Anyone who thinks Julian Dicks, Neil Ruddock, Dean Saunders and Paul Stewart are Liverpool players is in need of medical attention.
As a player, he was the greatest midfielder and leader I’ve seen in a red shirt. He made fans and the team feel invincible. Mike Nevin summed it up best for me: his will to win was born of a fury, a rage known to few. Let’s be grateful he found football, Lord alone knows how he’d have turned out otherwise…
My wife’s late dad was a warehouse manager at the Army and Navy stores, owned by Souness’s father-in-law (first wife). My wife’s dad had been to his boss’s house a couple of times and previously met the daughter and Souness.
One evening my wife’s parents were out for a meal in Liverpool and Souness was in there. My wife’s dad didn’t even think Souness had recognized him, but when he called for the bill it turned out Souness had covered it.
On the Sun thing, as fucked up as it was, Souness’s contrition has always sounded completely sincere. He’s clearly troubled by this incident to this day. It was an egregious mistake, but a mistake nonetheless. He has more than earned the benefit of the doubt so far as I’m concerned, which is why I still regard him as a LFC legend.
Nice piece, Neil btw. Spot on about his ability to control the tempo of a game and how rare that is. Hell, he controlled the tempo of whole seasons. We’ve never found an adequate replacement: a once in a generation player.
Souness was the most complete midfielder I have ever seen, Zidane, Zico and Platini were perhaps more creative but drifted in and out of games. In the 1981 final against Madrid, Souness dominated as he did in Rome and stopped the other team in their tracks. The hat-trick against CSKA Sofia is as good as anything Zidane, Zico et al produced and it was on a wet Wednesday on a dog of a pitch. The little pass for Kenny in 78 against Brugges turns all the defenders creating the space.
Souness is the reason that i never considered Gerrard a center mid, because you need discipline and control, as well as the burst of energy. Thats not taking anything away from Gerrard but i always thought Stevie was more like Kenny or Zidane but with more pace than Souness.
Pick two world elevens, any players, then put Souness in one team and then imagine a game between the two and the side with Souness in wins.
Souness as manager was dealt a difficult hand.
1. John Smith had been replaced by David Moores and there was a big difference between the two
2, The boot room had grown old, Paisley retired as a director in 1992 due to ill health. A lot of the wise old hands were no longer there, Phil Thompson being the only replacement for the next generation
3, The elephant in the room was Hillsborough and how this affected the club, staff and players; not a lot was known about post traumatic stress and from the outside it looked like the club never put anything in place. The boot room were the war generation and had lived through death, When David Faircloughs father died he said there was little or no support, Kenny himself needed a break so probably did others
4, Hanson retired and Gillespie was 30 and sold for 925.000 to Celtic, (good price for injury prone CB)
5, UEFA directive meant Liverpool had to buy English to compete in Europe.
Context is everything but being out of Europe and then having to buy English players to compete in Europe was a massive task. When did 11 English players win anything? On top of that Liverpool was regarded as the best run club in the country, but with the exception of Peter Robinson most had grown old and retired. The backroom support enjoyed by Kenny had gone and a young David Moores had replaced John Smith.
Souness gets the blame for a lot and he did not help himself, however, whilst he was the Rangers manager and had done well and was an obvious choice, it was not the logical choice if you have a strategy of promoting from within. The logical choice was either Roy Evans or Phil Thompson whom was brought back under Kenny in 1986 and his assistant at the time.
The appointment of Souness broke the strategy adopted by John Smith of promoting a manager from within that had no previous experience, and it was broken by David Moores, Souness happened to be the manager that was brought in and like any manager coming into a club he wanted to bring his people (which is normal) he (Souness) had had success at Rangers doing things his way, he was an ex-Liverpool player but that was 7 years ago and a lot had changed, he had not been at the club through Hysel or Hillsborough and in many ways that is where he fell down, had he been at the club during Hillsborough he would never had talked to the S*n, but that is why you promote from within, especially if you are still winning and when Kenny left the team still was, yes it needed young blood, but that was all it needed.
Souness is blamed for breaking the boot room but it was David Moores that broke it by appointing Souness and changing the strategy of promoting from within in order to keep the continuity and to avoid rapid change.
With one eye on Europe; Liverpool / Souness then bought expensive English players when others teams just bought players to win the league.
Within 12 months of David Moores as chairman
1 The boot room policy of promoting managers from within had ended
2 English players (not the best players) were bought with one eye on Europe
Because its only partly true. Neil Ruddock and Julian Dicks shouldn’t have been anywhere near a Liverpool shirt, but then, neither should David Speedie and Jimmy Carter, both signed by Kenny. Liverpool lost Mark Lawrenson to a freak injury in 1986, Alan Hansen was coming to the end of his career, central defence should have been identified as an top priority, but it wasn’t, and we eventually end up with the likes of Ruddock, Steve Harkness and Nicky Tanner.