MUCH was made of John W Henry’s love of Michael Lewis’s book Moneyball. Billy Beane, its star, took the unfashionable Oakland Athletics baseball team to success against the odds using statistical analysis to tear up the traditional scouting methods and identify undervalued players.
His methods transformed one of the poorest teams in baseball into one of the best.
Damien Comolli, the former director of football strategy at Liverpool, worked with Beane, who, in 2002, was approached by Henry to be the general manager of the Boston Red Sox.
Comolli also worked as European scout for Arsenal for seven seasons, uncovering Kolo Toure (£150,000), Emmanuel Eboue (£1m) and Gael Clichy (£250,000) among others for fees well below their future worth.
Henry, unsurprisingly, is a big fan of the Arsenal model and wants a greater return for Liverpool’s wage bill which, according to the Financial Times, was the third highest in the league when Comolli was appointed.
That bill not only failed to deliver enough quality in his eyes, but the squad it paid for offered little resale value.
At Arsenal, even top performers like Robin Van Persie are reportedly earning as little (in relative terms) as £70,000-a-week.
To Henry, too many older players at Anfield were on expensive deals with little prospect of them being sold on for an acceptable price. It’s for this reason that the future of Dirk Kuyt and Maxi Rodriguez remains in doubt – regardless of the set up of the new football management structure.
FSG have always planned with Uefa’s Financial Fair Play rules in mind – an aim to restrict excessive spending that will, in theory at least, stop clubs “doing a Chelsea” or these days “doing a Manchester City”.
Henry is also said to have read Soccernomics,a book by Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski.
Unlike Moneyball it is specific to football and some of the analytical tools and successful use of data detailed there will undoubtedly now be used at Liverpool.
One club that Soccernomics cites as being run in a ‘Moneyball way’ is Lyon.
They won their first Ligue One title in 2002, starting a record-breaking streak of seven successful championship wins. In 2009-10 they reached the semi-finals of the Champions League after three previous quarter-final appearances.
In the season just gone, they won the French Cup, after four years without a trophy, but missed out on the Champions League for the first time since 2000 after finishing fourth in the league.
Lyon has a reputation for developing promising talent, who would not only achieve greatness in France, but also abroad and internationally.
Notable examples include Michael Essien, Florent Malouda, Juninho Pernambucano, Cris, Éric Abidal, Mahamadou Diarra, Patrick Müller, and Karim Benzema.
Owner Jean-Michel Aulas rid the club of its debt and transformed it from a second division team into one of the richest in football but he has been criticised by fans for running Lyon like a business.
Soccernomics says of him: “Aulas’s theme is that over time, the more money a club makes, the more matches it will win, and the more matches it wins, the more money it will make. In the short term you can lose a match, but in the long term there is rationality, even to soccer.”
Under Aulas, Lyon have won the Ligue 1 title seven times and have qualified for the Champions League in 12 consecutive seasons
What Moneyball, Lyon , Soccernomics (and Henry and FSG) have in common is they separate emotion and sentiment from cold hard facts.
So while we as fans may have been up in arms at the decision to sell Xabi Alonso to Real Madrid for £30million, this approach would rubber-stamp such a move.
Alonso was 27, in his prime, so therefore would never command a higher sell-on fee.
Where Rafa Benitez and Liverpool failed on that transfer was in not having an adequate replacement lined up. It is unlikely Alberto Aquilani would have been signed by Henry and co because of his age (26), price (£17m) and his appalling injury record.
Henry has in the past made it clear he does not believe Liverpool has enough quality young players at the club and this summer already there has been talk of an under-23 recruitment policy.
More specifically, if Soccernomics is to be believed, that age range is likely to be 20-22.
Players in that age bracket are considered old enough to be judged but young enough to be affordable. And if a big fee is paid out for players of that age there is time for them to develop and produce a return on the investment.
Younger is considered too much of a gamble as it’s difficult to judge players at that age. Talent is easily frittered away and players that look world beaters at that age can quickly fade into obscurity. Florent Sinama-Pongolle and Anthony Le Tallec anyone?
Whether that totally rules out moves for older players remains to be seen.
Arsene Wenger has always had a policy of offering over-30s no more than a one-year deal but he backtracked on that some time back to sign Sébastien Squillaci on a three-year contract.
Some have suggested we may never see the likes of Gary McAllister, signed aged 35, at Anfield again, but things don’t look quite so cut and dried.
McAllister may have been old, but he was signed on a free, and only on a one-year contract. It could be that length of contract for older players, not just their age, is the crucial factor (Craig Bellamy, on a free at 32, signed a two-year contract).
Back in 2010 the priorities were clear when Henry said: “The wage bill is high, it is going to be high next year, and we are not a young team. That is disappointing.”
Nevertheless, according to Soccernomics, the key to Lyon’s success has been long-term stability – in terms of players and staff.
So while they have had six managers since 2000 – Jacques Santini, Paul Le Guen, Gerard Houllier, Alain Perrin, Claude Puel and current boss Remi Garde – the president and Bernard Lacombe – who has been technical manager, trainer, manager and now special advisor to the president – have remained.
Lacombe is renowned for his eye for a player and it is clear he will remain for as long as Aulas does.
Lyon believe in the ‘power of crowds’ – the more minds analysing a situation the better the result.
This is why future transfers at Liverpool are likely to involve numerous senior football people coupled with support staff – scouts, data analysts and so on.
At Lyon six or seven people are involved in making a decision on transfers. The manager (coach) is almost seen as a temporary role. When he leaves nothing really changes – it’s evolution, not revolution.
Recently, they have favoured bringing players through from their academy, and have not made major splashes in the transfer market in the last two windows. But Lyon can still boast a squad full of internationals and the biggest wage bill in France. They move into a new stadium in 2014, the Stade des Lumières
The ‘power of crowds’ approach goes against the grain of the traditional set-up in England but, let’s be honest, the traditional set up hasn’t been that great to Liverpool in the last 20-odd years has it?
The club has blown millions on flop signings and has a poor record on recouping transfer fees for outgoing players. It wasn’t supposed to happen on FSG’s watch. It did. And the people responsible – Comolli and Kenny Dalglish – paid the price.
Other traits identified in Soccernomics will ring a few bells with Liverpool fans.
For instance: “A new manager wastes money; don’t let him”.
When Roy Hodgson arrived at Anfield he immediately put the wheels in motion on two shocking deals – Christian Poulsen, a 30-year-old midfielder widely regarded as being past his best, and Paul Konchesky, a 29-year-old average full-back who had found his level at Fulham.
In both cases the prime reason for their recruitment seemed to be that Hodgson had worked with them before. Out went £10m for the pair and worryingly they were handed long-term deals – Poulsen three years and Konchesky four years.
Fabio Aurelio, a 31-year-old and surely one of the most injury-prone players ever to wear the red shirt, was ludicrously handed a two-year contract.
Henry, watching from afar, must have been cringing.
Meanwhile, out the door went youngsters including Emilano Insua, a 21-year-old twice capped for Argentina, Lauri Dalla Valle, a 19-year-old Finnish striker described by Liverpool’s official site as ‘one of the most promising youngsters at the club’, and Swedish left winger Alexander Kakaniklic, also 19.
To let players of that ilk leave for next to nothing in exchange for short-term ‘sticking plaster’ signings like Poulsen and Konchesky seemed to make little sense football or business-wise. It still doesn’t.
By common consensus, the same could be said of Andy Carroll, Stewart Downing and Charlie Adam.
This emphasises how the manager in the traditional model has too much power in player decisions and the opportunity to waste money or sign the wrong player is left too much to chance.
Another Soccernomics rule is: “Stars of World Cups and European Champions are more often than not overvalued.”
Again, something we know all too well. Senegalese duo El Hadji Diouf and Salif Diao were signed for a combined £14m during the 2002 World Cup. Both flopped, with £10m spitting ‘striker’ Diouf earning the dubious honour of becoming the first number nine in Liverpool history to go a whole season without a goal.
To rub salt into the wounds, Diouf was signed at the expense of Nicolas Anelka, who had enjoyed a successful loan spell at Anfield.
The book also suggests certain nationalities are overvalued and clubs need to look beyond the norm to find a bargain.
Too often agent recommendations are taken as read and the club fails to put in the spadework itself. If a player is from a ‘fashionable’ country (Spain, France, Holland etc) the club will sign him.
That means an increased price a) for the agent’s work b) because other clubs will also have been notified and c) because it is an ‘obvious’ signing.
So long-term Liverpool are more likely to be looking for the new Wilson Palacios than buying a Xavi. Palacios was signed by Wigan for £770,000 from Deportivo Olimpia in the Honduras League (via a loan spell at Birmingham) and sold to Spurs for £12m just a year later.
“Centre forwards are overvalued; goalkeepers are undervalued.”
Clearly this was a rule recognised by Rafa Benitez who was happy to sign Pepe Reina, 28, to a six-year deal. Reina, who until last season’s dip in form was rated one of the top keepers in the world, was bought for just £6m aged 23.
As for strikers, Robbie Keane – signed for £20m aged 28 – never looked like value for money and so it proved, both for Liverpool and Spurs. It’s the hardest position to sign a player that’s worth his fee. The jury is still out on Carroll, but chances are he’ll never be truly ‘worth’ £35m.
“Gentlemen prefer blondes.”
Soccernomics says one English club noticed its scouts kept recommending blonde players, most likely because they stand out more.
A key aspect to Billy Beane’s approach in Moneyball is challenging misconceptions about baseball players. One being that a player ‘doesn’t look like a player’.
These preconceived ideas were proven to have affected the judgement of scouts at the highest level and it’s not beyond the realms of possibility that similar judgements are made in football.
Take Peter Crouch for example. How many times have you heard someone say he doesn’t look the part? Plenty said it when he signed for Liverpool – less said it when he finished top goalscorer in the 2006-7 campaign.
Again, it’s hard not to think about Carroll. The ‘right’ Carroll that we saw at the end of the campaign, notably in the FA Cup, looked a pretty formidable prospect, but many will always doubt him according to this theory solely on his stature.
“Sell players at the right time”
As Beane said: “You’ve always got to be upgrading, or you’re f***ed!”
Managers – clubs – should try to recognise when a player is at the peak of his powers and move him on for good money before the deterioration sets in (or before they leave on a free).
The book also demonstrates that none of this is revolutionary thinking either. It might feel new, but Brian Clough and Peter Taylor applied these methods at Forest while our own Bob Paisley was well known for moving on players once they hit 30.
For Paisley then read Wenger now. The Frenchman sold Patrick Vieira to Juventus for £13.5m and Thierry Henry to Barcelona for £16m. Both were aged 29 and neither ever did as well after leaving Arsenal. The same can be said of Emmanuel Petit (who was 29) and Marc Overmars (27) who also joined Barca in a joint deal worth £30m.
It’s no coincidence that Wenger has a master’s degree in economics.
“Buy undervalued players who have personal problems”
The thinking here is bringing in talented players who have troubles and helping them tackle them. The book cites Wenger as an example, helping Paul Merson and Tony Adams with their addictions.
It makes you wonder again if this is a book on Benitez’s shelf. He bought Jermaine Pennant and Craig Bellamy – both talents, both with baggage.
It might seem like a risky approach but get it right and you could have a talent on your hands at the fraction of the cost. Most clubs, according to the book, are all too happy to let players get on with it – even when they have clear problems.
“Help your players settle”
It’s impossible to know how good Liverpool are at this but many clubs will spend millions on a transfer then fail to follow it up by helping their ‘investment’ settle.
Real Madrid spent £22m on Nicolas Anelka then didn’t bother to assign him a locker, introduce him to his team-mates or help him find a house.
In big business when senior executives move between countries they are assigned a ‘relocation consultant’ who sorts out schooling, housing and educates the family he is assigned on cultural rules and so on.
If Liverpool don’t do this already, they will do soon.
All in all, most of the approach appears to be less revolutionary than some would have you believe – much of it is common sense. Perhaps there hasn’t been enough common sense in the traditional model?
It’s a long-term model (unless some cash is thrown around in the short-term for a quick boost and to lift player morale) and one that is likely to steady the club and leave it poised to challenge in coming years rather than instantly rising up the league to push for number 19.
If Liverpool can now look forward to some stability after all that has come before then many fans will welcome that.
Others will undoubtedly pour scorn on any form of change or reinvention and this remains an ongoing challenge for Henry and co – football supporters and players, by in large, are not patient creatures.
Nevertheless, as it says in Soccernomics: “If most clubs are wasting most of their transfer money, then a club that spends wisely is going to outperform.”
It’s been a while since Liverpool did either.
Excellent piece.. And if this is an indication of how our year zero will be ran by FSG then I’m all for it.
Excellent piece Gareth, hopefully it will assuage the fears of some.
Superb piece. Makes far more sense than keep employing different managers with different systems and methods. I’m all for this model providing its done right.
Bloody superb piece Gareth… Every fan should read and absorb this.
Fantastic read. Very insightful
Great article, Gareth!
It’s certainly given me food for thought.
Great piece. Insightful and soothing – in a weird way. But it doesnt detract from my suspicions of the owners nor the illogical approach to Martinez who in my eyes is simply not of the required stature for a club like Liverpool – notwithstanding our fanbase’s unrealistic expectations.
We’re not a big club anymore – but we’re still leagues above the likes of Martinez surely?
Is there a chapter that says some managers are over-valued? How about EVERY manager is overvalued then? Thats more or less the crux of the Lyon scenario isnt it – it doesnt matter who they are does it? If thats the case then I’ll be the manager – for £100k – a YEAR. There – I’ve managed to fit into the new structure and have saved them a shitload of money in the process.
Seriously though – to be a truly massive club again – to be challenging for everything – all clubs require figures to sell both the IDEA of the club and shirts. Having few players who stay for any length of time just wont do this – nor will changing managers every few seasons either. Real madrid NEED the likes of Ronaldo and Mourinho. Just as Barca NEED Messi and Xavi and Iniesta and (until recently) Guadiola. Arsenal – Wenger and Van Persie. Utd – Ferguson, Giggs, Scholes,Rooney et al. And so on and so on. Are THEIR models so flawed that we have to adopt one that is PURELY theoretical – in other words EXPERIMENTAL. In other words – A MASSIVE FUCKING GAMBLE? No. Theyre not.
We can afford this only if we lower our expectations to what is reasonable given the past two decades and the advances other clubs have made. Most match going fans have done this since Rafa left. Most of the rest – havent. But what about the owners? Theyve just got rid of a manager who won our first ‘thing’ for 6 years. Theyre expectations are possibly the most warped and unrealistic of anyones. And we’ve got to trust them to get this experimental, theoretical, managers dont really count PLAN (???) correct?
Nah I’ll pass I think.
Was there anything stated other than the obvious? football decisions need to be left to football people, kenny dalglish was so far out of the game after a 9year exile, rafa was obsessed with foreign influxes and roy signed names of yester-year or mediocrity… managers such as moyes, martinez, pardew and fergie testify to old school methods… however there are always going to be errors in signing players from abroad due to the element of ‘chance’ involved i.e. Diego forlan at Man Utd vs Athletico Madrid., hunger and desire (i.e, Robinho) and crucially playing time (young talent stagnates and goes unfilled on the bench)!
p.s. attacking/flair Brazilians have short ‘product-lifecycles’! i.e. Ronaldinho, Ronaldo, Adriano, Robinho? Kaka, etc
#footballisaneverelyincreasinglyovercomplicatedfieldbybusinesstycoons!
Excellent article. The author did an excellent job outlining the model from Soccernomics/Lyon while including examples from Liverpool to give everything context. The ‘leaks’ that seem to be coming out of FSG/Liverpool indicate that this sort of model is what they want to implement at LFC. I find this very exciting. The manager search has probably not gone as well as Henry and Co have wanted but I would guess many things, e.g. things that are not involving Dave Whelan, are going well. It will never be perfect, there will be rumours of egos colliding and such. There will be a mistake or setback with the personnel on the first try but I think this is the only way Liverpool can compete at the top of european football. And that is where we belong. I hope the club announces the sporting/technical director(s) before the manager, though. And it is not a stretch to think that one of the appointments is already advising them.
Impressive stuff, Gareth, it has opened my eyes on many things that I would only guess on what’s possibly going on behind the scenes.
Can’t tell I am very excited about it though. Not because I am a ‘traditionalist’. I perfectly understand the necessity to move forward for a football club, to be economically successful, modern and all. But there is one little issue that soccernomic scientists seem to miss out:
i.e. that football is the most romantic and passionate sport of all sports.
As someone who (totally irrationally, I know, but that’s the whole point!) was crying in voice for a few days after Fernando Torres had left the club, it could be tough to get used to the new reality. To see the favorite players leave the club on their peak, etc.
Hence the question: while building this sustainable, economically and scientifically successful model, do the people who implement that, take one of the most important things into consideration: i.e. the FANS and their high charged emotions. The fans who actually pay money. Will the fan base remain as strong, and will it grow, if football becomes considerably less romantic, because this system leaves little space for legends, for big personalities, for romance, for passion. Disposable managers, disposable players, cold statistics and numbers instead…
You might say that you were crying when Torres left, but we got 50 million for him and he hasn’t been the same player since. Might have been a different story if he had stayed though. But if we had spent that money on 2-3 younger players who made the team better would your reaction be that strong? If we got 2-3 players of Suarez quality as his replacement would you be that mad? Say we had replaced Torres with Cavani and Suarez and they were banging in goals for us and making us a force in europe, would you not have started to love them just as much?
Great article Gareth, very good read!
Excellent article Gareth. I have read both books but what you article does is put it into context for Liverpool and the premier league.
@gareth
Personally this formation would suit LFC as it will bring out the best in them
& make way for future too
http://lineupbuilder.com/?sk=3f6
According to ESPN America, young South Americans have been put off the EPL after the appalling treatment of our Luis. The only club they would come to is Liverpool, thanks to the way they stood by the player. Lucas has also been preaching the LFC gospel in Brazil, saying it’s the perfect place for a young Brazilian to come to. We’ve already got the tie in with Nacional.
With a proper approach to integrating such players in place, a few South Americans already here to welcome them, and a young, tactically astute manager, whose mother tongue happens to be Spanish, we may see a nice production line of South American talent coming our way.
importantly, I think the Liverpool scouting network agrees with you. The club has been linked with several players from South America. And in the soccernomics model the players have generally not been from the two inflated markets: Argentina and Brazil.
Well done Gareth, an article that reinforced my optimism regarding FSG. When faced with the glaring evidence, it makes sense to consider purchases by committee, finding a manager who will go along with this is another issue. However, the mistakes made in the transfer market must have John Henry baffled. As much as I wanted KD to succeed, his buys disappointed me before they kicked a ball. The thought of another year of Kenny picking prospects must have alarmed FSG. I wonder if Kenny was asked to share responsibility for future player purchases? I almost shed a tear when you mentioned Anelka being allowed to leave in order to accommodate Diouf and Daio, a sad day indeed.
Loved it. Great article!
Read this stuff when FSG came in and they apointed Commolli, if they wanted to have a number of people in charge of signings then why did not FSG do this at the same time or even last summer, prior to Kenny having a contract. With the poor signings made by Roy and cecil then you could argue that you needed at least an extra person to deal with contracts and at CEO level
Good read, nice one Gaz.
Top draw that
Liked the article, very well presented. Particularly liked the piece about who “looks” like a player. Can we now apply that to who “looks” like a manager? So if a new manager doesn’t wear a sheepskin coat, smoke a ciger, wear a bluetooth headset or a tracksuit with his initials on, we could be onto something?
ferd
Brilliant piece. Coincidentally I was reading this in the garden today before I read this article and two points struck me by this.
It appears to me that Newcastle are already successfully putting this into practice, sold Carroll for more than he is worth and shipped out big earners like Barton and Nolan and replaced them immediately with cheaper better players. forget the top 4 teams, and Chelsea, we are now competing with Newcastle in this market. The top teams will be buying the best players in the world whilst us and Newcastle will fighting it out for the unpolished gems. This strategy will take a while before we can compete for the top 4 places, hopefully we can steal a march on the big teams by implementing this strategy before the financial fair play rules come in.
Another point is when the book mentions Bernard Laconbe’s eye for players and how you have to keep people like that around. Could Benitez not do this role? Some of his earlier signings had all the hallmarks of this strategy, Alonso, Sissiko, Torres, Garcia, Reina, Crouch were all value for money and most left for more than we’re bought for.
really interesting read. i think sometimes its difficult to explain why a player that appears anonymous or peripheral still gives you a gut feeling that he could be good or even potentially special. just maybe coaches or managers could use these stats to convince the doubters.
BUT, be wary of the old saying “there are lies, there are damned lies and then there are statistics”
Good read that Gareth, thanks.
Worth remembering about Lyon though that they were pretty much always the best-funded team in France from about 2001 onwards thanks to their big sponsorship deal with Renault as well as Aulas’s cleverness. Plus they also had less of a distance to go to catch up with the other ‘big’ clubs in France, PSG and l’OM. LFC bridging the gap between where we are now and the sort of wealth that City and Chelsea can throw at things is going to require some incredibly smart people and a lot of luck along the way.
Just discovered this site and glad that I have, a thought provoking read, well done.
I disagree with the comment below.
“If a player is from a ‘fashionable’ country (Spain, France, Holland etc) the club will sign him.”
It’s not really about a “fashionable” country but rather the quality of the league in which the player has played in that matters. Clearly England, France, Spain, Holland and Italy have stronger leagues than smaller minnows such as Norway and thus its easier to see if a player is capable of playing at the highest level.
Boss that, Gareth. A perspicacious glance at what our new owners may be planning. Simultaneously exciting and terrifying!!
Lyon, for all their success in France, have never progressed beyond the Champions League QF.
Benitez, on the other hand, was successful in a much more difficult league (Spain) and won the Champions League at the first time of asking (as well as leading LFC to one more final and one SF).
With respect to “A new manager wastes money; don’t let him”, it is worth noting that Rafa’s worse buys came late in his time with Liverpool. These were almsot certainly the acquisitions of Robbie Keane and Alberto Aquilani, whereas his earlier important acquisitions (Alonso, Arbeloa, Agger, Skrtel, Torres, Reina) were almost universally excellent (and this does not include players like Dani Alves who would have been a steal had the club listened to Rafa’s pleas to buy the player well before he joined Barca). More importantly, seen over this entire time at LFC, Rafa’s transfer record was at least as good as Ferguson’s and perhaps even close to that of Arsene Wenger.
So FSG should perhaps be talking to Rafa Benitez rather than reading Soccernomics – it could end up saving them a lot of money and, more importantly, take Liverpool back to the pinnacle of English and European football.
Some common sense at Liverpool would be welcome. Any strategy needs to have some flexibility built in. A committee for transfers has some attractions but it could mean good decisions are stifled. A strong dose of common sense and each decision based on its merits with no overdue regard to previous successes need to be embedded in any football philosoohy. – Commoli failed at Liverpool. The obvious need to get a striker in January when both Jelavic and Cisse were available at bargain prices was not addressed and defies belief. Above all Liverpool need to get smart.
Loved the book, and very much agree with many of its principles. Great piece!
hmmm.
this new methodology is going to have to produce some to match Rafa’s record, which had 2 of liverpool’s best 3 points finishes.
I wonder if we can be better than Arsenal at doing it. I suspect not.
Curious as to why FSG havent’ been able to get a DoF in. they’ve had long enough for that one.
This fabulous piece written in May 2012, before Brendan’s appointment, and if the only signing so far is anything to go by, along with the exit of the likes of Maxi, Kuyt, and possibly Bellamy, then this must be the model that has been adopted by FSG. It sounds like a prophecy!!!
Again, look at the potential targets: Allen, Ramirez, Tello; they are all obviously within the age-bracket described by Gareth in this piece.
This is so incisive. Good job Gareth!